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Abstract
A light-weight approach for securing On-demand routing protocols for Ad hoc network - SOARP, is presented. Pairwise
shared keys between pairs of mobile nodes and hash values keyed with them (K-MAC: Keyed Message Authentication Code)
are employed to authenticate routing messages and the validity of the path selected, which makes our approach computationally
efﬁcient compared with prior approaches based on digital signatures. Security measures for preventing, detecting and responding
to attacks are also presented to secure the forwarding of data packets in addition to the signaling messages of the routing protocol.
Security analysis and simulations show that our approach can be used in Controlled Ad-hoc networks, and effectively thwarts
many attacks to the routing process caused by malicious or compromised nodes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Ad-hoc network is a group of wireless nodes that are deployed on-demand as a multi-hop packet radio network
without the aid of pre-established infrastructure. Nodes in Ad-hoc network are assumed to be willing to route messages for
other nodes, such that every node has the responsibility of a router as well as a common user of the network. Ad-hoc network
can be rapidly deployed in critical scenarios such as battle ﬁelds and rescue missions of disasters because a prior infrastructure
is not necessitated, which makes Ad-hoc network a promising technology for new applications of wireless networks.
However, most researches on Ad-hoc network by far focus only on highly efﬁcient channel utilization and data forwarding
algorithms, and relatively less work have been done in the ﬁeld of securing daily operations of Ad-hoc network. The purpose of
this paper is of designing a generic mechanism to secure On-demand (Reactive) routing protocols for Ad-hoc network, which
is easy to deploy at startup stage, light-weighted in daily routing operations, but powerful enough to thwart many threats to
Ad-hoc routing protocols.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the security models of attackers and application environments for
Ad-hoc networks. Section 3 is an overview of on-demand routing and possible threats to Ad-hoc routing protocols. Section
4 is the mechanisms we developed to secure On-demand routing in Ad-hoc network. Section 5 is the security analysis, and
performance evaluation by simulations is presented in Section 6. Section 7 are discussions about related works and concluding
remarks are presented in Section 8.
II. SECURITY MODEL
A. Application Environment Model
We classify the application environments of Ad-hoc network into two groups according to if the participants (nodes) of
network are under the control of a centralized administrative authority.
In Controlled Ad-hoc Environment,the Ad-hoc network is under the control of a certain central authority, only authorized
nodes can join the network and a prior negotiation or initialization are required before actual deployment of the network. The
beforehand negotiation with central authority might involve parameter initialization, or cryptographic keys distribution etc. The
typical cases of controlled Ad-hoc environments are critical scenarios such as disaster rescue, battle ﬁeld etc. In Free Ad-hoc
Environment, nodes can join and leave Ad-hoc network at will, and there is no restriction for them to negotiate with a certain
central administrative authority before they are allowed to take advantage of the network resources. No central administration
does not mean no beforehand negotiation for necessary cryptographic keys, which any security measure based on cryptography
cannot avoid, but achieve it somehow without the control of the central administration. Free Ad-hoc environments are usually
civilian applications, such as participants of temporary conference in a meeting room.
B. Attacker Model
The power of an attacker is determined by his knowledge mastered at the time when he launches the attack, and the
complexity of an attack is often proportional to the number of attackers involved. Malicious Node(MN) is not legal node
and does not have necessary cryptographic keys in order to participate in normal operating of routing process; Compromised
Node(CN) is legal node but has been taken over by attackers, so attackers possibly have access to the cryptographic keys
owned by this node. Because of possible access to related keys, compromised node can launch not only the same attacks
as those done by malicious nodes, but is able to originate more complicated attacks ’legally’ in a hidden manner, which are
difﬁcult to detect; Group of Adverse Nodes(GAN) always work collusively and the attacks launched by them are far more
delicate than those originated by only one attacker. GAN nodes might include malicious nodes, compromised nodes or nodes
with more powerful capabilities than other nodes in network, such as longer range transmission antenna. But they need an
appropriative channel to coordinate their actions as to attack collaboratively.
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A. Overview of On-demand routing
In On-demand (or Reactive ) Ad-hoc routing protocols, routes exist only when necessary. For example, if node S(Source)
want to communicate with node D(destination) but no route found in local routing table, A route query message RREQ will
be generated by S and broadcast into the network, further forwarded by any intermediate node receiving it, until it arrives
the destination D. Intermediate nodes also setup corresponding reverse forwarding information when they are forwarding a
RREQ. When destination node ﬁnally receives RREQ, it will unicast back a ”Route Reply” message RREP to the source
S via the reverse path recorded in intermediate nodes. At the same time when intermediate nodes are reversely forwarding
RREP, they also setup the corresponding data forwarding entry for later packets targeting at the destination D. The source
node may receive multiple RREPs and will choose one neighbor node as the next hop for the destination according to some
speciﬁc metrics ,such as to choose the route with minimum hops to destination.
B. Threats to Ad-hoc routing protocols
The attacks to Ad-hoc routing protocol could be classiﬁed according to the originator of attackers. External Attacks are
originated by malicious nodes ,who lack necessary keys as to participate in normal routing operation. Common external threats
include impersonation(spooﬁng), meaning an attacker attempts to impersonate another one; modiﬁcation, meaning entries in
routing messages have been modiﬁed; fabrication, meaning attackers fabricate fake routing messages and interfere with normal
routing operation by inserting them into the network etc. Internal Attacks are originated by compromised nodes, who might
have necessary keys to participate in routing operation. Internal attacks are formally similar to external attacks, but they are far
more difﬁcult to detect because attackers have access to valid keys. Complicated Attacks are often launched by GAN nodes
collusively. ”Worm-hole” attack is a typical example, where two GAN nodes tunnel a packet from one point of network to
another point far away enough, in hope that any receiver of this packet would believe the sender of this packet is in his close
neighborhood. Another instance is D-DOS (Distributed Deny Of Service) launched by a group of nodes. D-DOS are more
likely to interrupt the communication of network than DOS done by a single attacker because the power and resources owed
by a single node is usually much more limited than that of a group of attackers.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Assumptions
We assume that each pair of users ( Node Ni and node Nj )in the network shares a pairwise secret key Ki;j, which is used
for the authentication of route discovered during route discovery process. We will present the key distribution scheme in next
subsection, which is based on the Self-Certiﬁed Key (SCK) [9]. The underlying wireless link is bidirectional, meaning if node
S can send packet to node D, then S can also overhear the transmission of node D.
B. Self-certiﬁed public key cryptosystem [9]
In asymmetric public key cryptosystem, each user has a pair of secret and public keys for encryption/decryption, digital
signature etc. Before a public key could be used, the binding between this public key and its owner must be authenticated, thus
to avoid masquerade attacks. There are two ways of ensuring the authenticity of a public key: explicit veriﬁcation and implicit
veriﬁcation. In explicit veriﬁcation, a trusted CA (certiﬁcate authority) will sign a certiﬁcate which binds a public key and the
ID of its owner, then any user can verify the certiﬁcate explicitly given the public key of the CA. In implicit veriﬁcation, the
authenticity of a public key is veriﬁed when it is used for decryption, signature veriﬁcation, and other cryptographic operations.
For example, a successful veriﬁcation of a signature means the public key does match the secret key used to sign this signature.
Self-certiﬁed key (SCK) system follows the track of implicit veriﬁcation. In SCK, the public key of a user U is not generated
and signed by the CA explicitly. Everyone, having the knowledge of the ID and a published piece of data of user U, will be
able to derive the public key of U, given the public key of CA. The following advantageous we will exploit are those features
of SCK which are very convenient and efﬁcient for our security mechanisms to secure reactive Ad-hoc routing protocols.
² Given N users in network, assuming their IDs are known to all users, in order to distribute their public keys, N credentials
(Called guarantees) are to be distributed, instead of N traditional certiﬁcates. The advantage is, unlike certiﬁcate based
asymmetric cryptosystem, these N guarantees can be published and need not to be certiﬁed (signed) by any trusted
authority, meaning we can distribute the public keys without the aid of on-line central administration like CA(Access to
CA is only required at the very initial stage of key generation, as described in shortly later). The binding of a guarantee
and its owner (More speciﬁc, the corresponding secret key)will be authenticated when cryptographic operations (with keys
derived from the guarantee) are performed.
² Given N guarantees are already distributed to all users of the network, and assuming the public key of CA is known to
everyone, any two users could compute a pairwise shared key known only to these two users in a non-interactive manner,
meaning no further negotiation message needed for key agreement between these two users, which is a big advantage
over traditional interactive key exchange methods such as Difﬁe-Hellman key exchanging protocol. Then these pairwise
shared keys could be used to encrypt data between users by conventional symmetric key encryption algorithms, or to
compute K-MAC (Keyed Message Authentication Code) by performing one-way hash operation etc. According to [9],
non-interactive key progression and agreement in SCK consist of following stages.
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KEY AGREEMENT BETWEEN ALICE AND BOB
User Alice: User Bob:
xA;t = xA;0 ¢ h(IDA;rA;t) + kA;t xB;t = xB;0 ¢ h(IDB;rB;t) + kB;t
yB;t = y
h(IDB;rB;t)
B;0 ¢ rB;t (mod p) yA;t = y
h(IDA;rA;t
A;0 ¢ rA;t (mod p)
KA;t = y
xA;t
B;t (mod p) KB;t = y
xB;t
A;t (mod p)
Kt = h(KA;t) Kt = h(KB;t)
1) Initialization A certiﬁcate authority Z is assumed to be existed, and Z chooses large primes p;q with qj(p¡1) (i.e.,
q is a prime factor of p¡1), a random number kA 2R Z¤
q, where Z¤
q is a multiplicative subgroup with order q and
generator ®, then Z generates its secret-public key pair (xZ;yZ) ,and we assume that the public key yZ is known to
everyone in network. To issue the secret key for user Alice, Z computes the signature parameter rA = ®kA (mod p)
and sA = xZ ¢ h(IDA;rA) + kA (mod q), where h() is a collision-free hash function. Then Alice publishes the
parameter rA, also called guarantee, together with her identiﬁer IDA and keep the xA = sA as her secret key. Her
corresponding public key could be computed by everyone who knows the yZ;IDA and rA as
yA = y
h(IDA;rA)
Z ¢ rA (mod p)
We denote this initial basic key pair as (xA;0;yA;0)
2) User-controlled key progression Alice can switch her keys either after a ﬁxed time interval of length l or after an
arbitrary time period. Now we assume the ﬁrst setting, where Alice will use key pair (xA;t;yA;t) in time interval
[t ¢ l;(t + 1) ¢ l]. Alice then chooses n random pairs fkA;i 2R Z¤
q ; rA;i = ®kA;i (mod p)g where 1 · i · n, then
the key progression is deﬁned by
xA;t = xA;0 ¢ h(IDA;rA;t) + kA;t (mod q)
And the corresponding public key is given by
yA;t = y
h(IDA;rA;t)
A;0 ¢ rA;t (mod p)
3) Agreement of the pairwise shared keys
The non-interactive algorithm of key agreement between two users are presented in Table I, and the pairwise shared
key obtained by Alice and Bob is equal because
h(KA;t) = h(y
xA;t
B;t (mod p)) = h(®xA;txB;t (mod p)) = h(y
xB;t
A;t (mod p)) = h(KB;t)
C. Approach to secure Ad-hoc On-demand routing protocols
According to the generic operating of On-demand routing in Ad-hoc network, our protocol is divided into several phases ,
which are corresponding to different On-demand routing stages. A simple example and ﬂow of routing messages are shown
in Figure 1 for illustration of following descriptions.
² Route Query Initialization
When node S(Source) want to communicate with node D(Destination) but no route entry for D existed in local routing
table, S will generate a route query message RREQ and broadcast it into the network. The RREQ has following format:
RREQ = fRREQ;S;D;QNum;SMACs;dg;where
RREQ is the type identiﬁer of route query message, S;D are the IDs of source and destination node respectively, and
QNum is a randomly generated route query number. Then the IDs of nodes S;D and random query number QNum
uniquely identify current round of route discovery for speciﬁc destination D. The keyed-MAC (Message Authentication
Code) value SMACs;d = Hash(RREQ;S;D;QNum;Keys;d) will serve as a signature of S for destination to verify
the integrity of this RREQ and it is really generated by source S. We use Keyi;j to represent the pairwise shared
key between nodes Ni and Nj, which is afore-hand computed according to the non-interactive key exchange algorithm
described in previous subsection, obviously Keyi;j = Keyj;i.
² Route Query Forwarding
Any intermediate node receiving RREQ will further forward it if this RREQ has never been received (with same S;D
and QNum), or the RREQ will be dropped. At the same time, reverse forwarding info towards the source node will
also be setup in the intermediate nodes.
² Checking RREQ At Destination D
D will not further forward RREQ when receiving RREQ because he is the destination. First, D will check to see
if this RREQ has been received from a same neighbor before according to the query number carried; Second, D will
authenticate if this RREQ is really originated from S and no content has been modiﬁed during transmission by evaluating
Hash(RREQ;S;D;QNum;Keyd;s) = SMACs;d. If both checks are successful, D will initialize a route reply process.
41Fig. 1. Illustration of secure routing
² Route Reply Initialization
D generates a route reply message RREP according to the RREQ received, speciﬁcally
RREP = fRREP;D;N1;RNum;HOPS;SMACd;1;fNodeListg;MMACd;sg; where
RREP is the type identiﬁer of route reply message and N1 is the upstream neighbor, from which the RREQ was received;
route reply number RNum is equal to QNum plus one; HOPS represents the hop-count to destination, here HOPS = 0
because D is the destination itself; SMACd;1 = Hash(RREP;D;N1;RNum;HOPS;fNodeListg;Keyd;1) is the K-
MAC for the purpose of neighbor-by-neighbor authentication between D and N1; the fNodeListg ﬁeld will record all
the intermediate nodes gone through by the RREP, and now fNodeListg = fNullg; the other k-MAC MMACd;s =
Hash(HOPS;CORE;fNodeListg;Keyd;s) will be further processed by intermediate nodes and be used by source S
to authenticate the validity of the path reported by RREP; CORE = Hash(D;S;RNum;Keyd;s) serves as a signature
of D for source S to authenticate that this RREP is really generated by D
[Node Numbering Rule:] fNodeListg actually represents a path from S to D. For clarity, they are numbered increasingly
from D to S. For example, a fNodeListg could looks like fD;N1;N2;N3;:::Nhopsg.
² Reverse Route Reply Forwarding
Any intermediate node Ni in the reverse route will authenticate, process and further forward received RREP to its
upstream node Ni+1, which was recorded in its reverse forwarding table. Firstly, Ni will check to see if this RREP has
been received before according to the route reply number carried; Secondly, checking if this RREP is truly forwarded
by the downstream node Ni¡1 and its contents are not modiﬁed by evaluating
42SMACi¡1;i = Hash(RREP;Ni¡1;Ni;RNumrep;HOPSrep;fNodeListgrep;Keyi;i¡1); where
SMACi¡1;i, RNumrep, HOPSrep and fNodeListgrep are the corresponding ﬁelds in received RREP message.
If both veriﬁcations are passed, Ni will update and further back-forward RREP to upstream node Ni+1 as:
RREP = fRREP;Ni;Ni+1;RNum;HOPS;SMACi;i+1;fNodeListg;MMACi;sg;where
HOPS = HOPSrep + 1, and SMACi;i+1 = Hash(RREP;Ni;Ni+1;RNum;HOPS;fNodeListg;Keyi;i+1);
fNodeListg = ffNodeListgrep;Ni¡1g, meaning Ni will append the ID of the downstream neighbor node, from which
it received the RREP, into the new fNodeListg; MMACi;s = Hash(HOPS;MMACi¡1;s;fNodeListg;Keyi;s),
where MMACi¡1;s is copied from the MMAC ﬁeld of received RREP
² Checking RREP At Source S
The veriﬁcation processing will be strait-forward if presented in “C-style” statements as shown in Figure 2. Basically, S
Fig. 2. Checking RREP at source S
repeats the same computations done by all the intermediate nodes from D to S (But with the keys owned by himself),
which were recorded in the fNodeListg of RREP, and the number of hash operations need to perform is equal to the
HOPS reported by this RREP.
If above veriﬁcation is successful , S could believe that the RREQ has reached destination D, every node listed in
fNodeListg actually participated in the reversal forwarding of RREQ and these intermediate nodes do provide a path
from S to D.
D. Route Maintenance
When node Ni on the path selected by source S to destination D ﬁnds the downstream link/route to destination D is broken,
Ni will generate a route error report massage RERR and unicast it back to the source S via the reverse path setup before,
which might invoke S to start a new round of route discovery. Before accepting the RERR message, we must be able to
ensure: the node generating the RERR message must be on the path to the destination; the node reporting link failure should
still be there when he reported the error. The process of sending back a RERR message from node Ni is almost the same
as that when node Ni originates a route reply to the source S. We only describe the main differences here and demonstrate
more details in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Ni generate RERR if downstream link/route is broken
The RERR message has the similar format to RREP, except that the message type identiﬁer and the computation of CORE,
which is computed as CORE = Hash(:::Hash(Ni;S;RNum;Keyi;S)), here i times Hash operations and i is equal to the
hops from node Ni to destination D. Nodes on the path will only process and back-forward a RERR received from its
43downstream node to destination D, which ensure the node Ni is still on the path to D when he reported the link failure. When
source node S ﬁnally received the RERR, he will perform the similar authentication procedure to that of a RREP, the only
difference part is the computation of CORE, which is shown as following, CORE = Hash(:::Hash(Ni;S;RNum;KeyS;i)),
here (HOPSS!D ¡ HOPSReported by RERR ¡ 1) times hash computations will be performed.
After authenticating the RERR, source S can initiate a new round of route query for destination D, if further communication
with D is still needed.
E. Secure Packet Delivery
So far we have discussed security measures which are sufﬁcient enough for the source to acquire route info for a destination
securely, but we still have no conﬁdence in succeeding data delivery process. In order to achieve reliable packet delivering,
neighbor-by-neighbor downstream monitoring and responding mechanism are introduced into our protocol, which is shown in
Figure 4. Any upstream neighbor on the path from source S to destination D will monitor the transmission of its downstream
Fig. 4. Illustration of Securing Packet Delivery
neighbor node, which could be done because we assume the wireless link is bidirectional. If the monitoring node ﬁnd that the
downstream neighbor failed to further forward data packets to destination D (Say below a pre-established threshold of packet
forwarding ratio), then the monitoring node will initialize a forwarding failure alert process which is very similar to the error
report process of link failure, except a different message type identiﬁer FALT. In this way, the source node S can have timely
notiﬁcation if any node failed to deliver data packets and S could also know where the problem happened. Once receiving a
forward failure alert, the source might re-initialize a new round of route discovery process to discover another route which
avoids the suspicious intermediate node. The veriﬁcation of FALT message is same as RERR message at the source node S
given FALT follows the same format and back-forwarding process as that of RERR, which are illustrated in Figure 4. We
admit that the monitoring mechanism used here are still naive, but we believe better detection and response techniques will
be developed and they are also part of our future work.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
For external attacks, because a malicious node MN has no necessary keys shared with other nodes as to participate in normal
routing operation, any modiﬁcation, fabrication ,replay and impersonation (spooﬁng) will be detected by either intermediate
nodes locally or by source node at last. For internal attacks, a compromised node CN cannot impersonate another node
Ni because CN lacks of the secret key know only to Ni, therefore, the compromised node cannot derive correct pairwise
shared keys between Ni and other nodes. CN could modify ﬁelds in RREP, such as hop-count, but it will be detected by
source node S because hash values are correlated with the chain of whole intermediate nodes (MMAC is keyed with the
shared keys between intermediate nodes and the source) and also related to the hop-count from S to D. Route loops could
be detected at the same time when S is checking the validity of the path because fNodeListg is provided. Due to the use of
randomly generated route query number, simple replay of RREQ and RREP will be easily detected by either intermediate
nodes or source/destination node. As mentioned earlier, the attacks launched by a group of adverse nodes (GAN) could be far
more complicated than attacks originated by a single adversary because of the information and power they control. Also we
cannot enumerate all the possible attack patterns generated by GANs, thus approaches based only on prevention might lose
its effect when the threats confronting are not those they are designed to handle. The approach we choose is a combination
of preventing, monitoring and responding, and try to maintain a reliable communication system at acceptable cost. On one
hand, the K-MAC based secure routing measures built in SOARP could be able to detect and thwart most common attacks
aimed at Ad-hoc routing, as explained before; on the other hand, neighbor-by-neighbor monitoring and necessary forwarding
failure alert will ﬁnd packet delivery failure timely and invoke source to initialize another round of route discovery for future
data delivery, no matter what kind of attack incurred that failure. Simulation results have shown that, which will be presented
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Fig. 5. Performance Comparison with AODV
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Fig. 6. 60% Nodes Perform Route-Cheating
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Fig. 7. 60% Nodes Fail to forward packets
shortly, even these simple monitoring and responding methods could achieve satisfactory performance even 60% nodes in
network are compromised.
VI. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of SOARP, we carry out simulations in network simulator NS-2
[1]. In our simulation conﬁguration, the ﬁeld size is 750m x 500m with 30 nodes moving around according to the random
way-point model. Each node is positioned at a random place at the beginning of simulation, and pauses for a certain interval
called pause time; then it will choose a new place and move there at a velocity uniformly distributed between 0 and 20m/s;
when it get there, it will pause again and choose a new position to which to move, so on and so forth. The trafﬁc pattern we
use is 10 randomly chosen source-destination sessions, each of them is a Constant Bit Rate (CBR) ﬂow at a rate of 4 packets
per second, and 512 bytes per packet in size; the radio range of underlying wireless link is 250m. The hash implementation we
use is MD5 from RSAREF library, which is public available for research purpose and proven to be strong enough. In another
words, we model the computational cost and according delay incurred by the authentication processing in SOARP.
The metrics we used to measure the performance are: Packet Delivery Ratio the total number of CBR packets received,
over the total number of CBR packets originated, over all the mobile nodes in the network; End2End Packet Delay the
average elapsed time between a CBR packet is passing to the routing layer and that packet is received at the destination
node; Route Discovery Delay the average time it takes for a node to ﬁnd a route to a destination; Normalized Routing
Overhead the total routing messages transmitted/forwarded over the total number of CBR packets received, over all mobile
nodes; Average Route Length the average route length (hop counts) of the paths discovered by nodes to transmit data packet,
over all mobile nodes in network.
A. Performance without attackers
First we will see the performance difference between SOARP and Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector(AODV) Routing
protocol [8], which is one of the leading Ad-hoc routing protocols, if there is no attackers in the network. The results are
shown in Figure 5 as a function of pause time. Each ﬁgure represents the average over runs of 10 random movement patterns at
each pause time, and the same patterns are used for both SOARP and AODV. The simulation time we choose is 200 seconds,
which means the nodes are stationary when the pause time is 200 second.
As shown in the (a), (b), (c) and (e) of Figure 5, the packet delivery ratio, packet delivery delay, average time to ﬁnd a route
and average route length are very close for both AODV and SOARP, which means SOARP is almost as efﬁcient as AODV
in routing discovery and data delivery, and K-MAC (hash computation) based security measures integrated in SOARP do not
incur much delay in route discovery and data delivery. SOARP does introduce higher route overhead than AODV, as shown
in (d) of Figure 5, which is mainly due to the neighbor by neighbor forwarding monitoring alert messages, because broken
of link will also result in failure of packets forwarding, which will trigger the upstream node to generate forwarding failure
alerts to source node.
B. Performance with attackers
To study the effectiveness of SOARP, we also design and carry out simulations when partial of the nodes in network
are compromised. Figure 6 shows the same evaluation metrics when 60 percent of the nodes are compromised and these
compromised nodes will fabricate fake route replies to any route query by claiming they are “zero” hop to the destination
node, and drop all the succeeding data packets passing through them. The purpose of this simulation is to study the effectiveness
of secure routing measures built in SOARP.
We can notice that the packet delivery ratio of AODV decreases dramatically, (a) of Figure 6 , because most of the packets
will be sent to the wrong routes and dropped by compromised nodes. When routing with AODV, the source node might be
misled by incorrect routing replies and choose a route with a length much shorter, (e) of Figure 6, than when there is no
compromised node, (e) of Figure 5; Because of that, the routing overhead is relatively lower, (d) of Figure 6, and average time
to ﬁnd a route is also shortened, (c) of Figure 6.
45On the other side, SOARP still performs well with over 80 percent packet delivery rate at all pause time runs, (a) of Figure
6. The costs of this are longer average time to ﬁnd a route to destination, end-2-end packet delay and higher routing overhead,
as shown in (b) (c) (d) of Figure 6 respectively; the average route length found by SOARP is longer than that of AODV
because SOARP cannot be misled by any route reply from compromised nodes, (e) of Figure 6.
Figure 7 shows the simulation results when 60 percent of the nodes are compromised, but they will follow regular routing
operations correctly, and just drop any sequential packet passing through them (Black-Hole Attack). The purpose of this
simulation is to study the effectiveness of neighbor by neighbor monitoring and responding mechanisms of SOARP. We can
notice that SOARP can still achieve over 80 percent packet delivery ratio at all runs, while AODV only achieve 55 percent, (a)
of Figure 7; the price to pay is higher routing overhead because more forwarding failure alerts and routing discovery messages
incurred, (d) of Figure 7, and relatively larger packet delivery delay (b) of Figure 7; the average time to ﬁnd route and average
route length are similar to that when there is no compromised node in network, because all nodes still cooperate correctly in
route discovery process, and the ﬁeld size we use is relatively of a small scale, (c) (e) of Figure 7.
VII. RELATED WORK
Recently, many efforts have been made to secure routing protocols speciﬁc for Ad hoc network. SAR [12] organizes nodes of
a network into a trust hierarchy with different trust levels, nodes on the same level share a session key, and a node can process
and further forward messages only if the node itself is on or above a speciﬁed level of trust. Authors of [7] use keyed MAC to
authenticate route request and reply messages between source and destination. Because authentication is end-2-end based and
there is no authentication for intermediate nodes, it might be possible for attackers to impersonate other nodes in the middle of
the path, even just temporarily. Ariadne [2] is designed for reactive routing protocol DSR [3] and assumes shared secrets exist
between each pair of nodes and a broadcast authentication scheme such as TESLA is required. For Ariadne to work properly,
time synchronization among all nodes is assumed, which might be so demanding for Ad-hoc network in some scenarios. ARAN
[10] has a similar route discovery process like common reactive Ad-hoc routing protocols and digital signature is used for the
authentication of routing messages between source and destination. The work in [6] presents a self-organizing scheme based
on threshold signing algorithm which could provide authentication service for all nodes in network and well scale to large size
network. Some other works also based on threshold signing can be found in [5], [11], [4]. The protocol proposed in [13] uses
information of hop-count together with hash chains to authenticate mutable part in routing messages, and digital signature is
introduced to protect the immutable ﬁelds of signaling messages, it is computationally expensive because intermediate nodes
need to perform a signature veriﬁcation for every message received.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a light-weight protocol of securing Reactive routing in Ad-hoc network. Our protocol is ready to
deploy and computationally efﬁcient comparing to digital signature based approaches, because pairwise shared keys between
each pair of mobile nodes and hash values keyed with them (K-MAC: Keyed Message Authentication Code) are employed to
authenticate routing messages and the validity of the path selected. Combined security measures for preventing, detecting and
responding to attacks are used to secure both the delivery of data packets and the signaling messages of the routing protocol.
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